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PUBLIC SCHOOL OBLIGATIONS TO 
PAY PRIVATE SCHOOL TUITION: 
REINTERPRETING THE I.D.E.A. IN 
FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
v. T.A. 
E. CHANEY HALL* 
Like many high school students, T.A.1 had trouble in school. 
Unlike most high school students, T.A.’s problems were related to his 
undiagnosed Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).2 He 
found it difficult to concentrate and to complete his assignments, but 
with the help of his supportive parents and sister he was able to pass 
his classes.3 T.A.’s guidance counselor noticed that T.A. was struggling 
and, suspecting that T.A. might have a learning disability, referred him 
to the school psychologist to be evaluated for possible special 
education services.4 T.A.’s school responded quickly, and the school 
district’s team of psychologists and specialists determined that he 
might have ADHD.5 
For about six months following the initial evaluation, the school 
district had psychologists and educational specialists test T.A. to 
determine if he had a learning disability.6 The school district’s staff 
met with T.A.’s parents to discuss his difficulties in school, but they 
never disclosed that they suspected T.A. might have ADHD or that 
 
 * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. In court documents, which are public records accessible by all, minors are identified 
only by their initials to protect their identity. 
 2. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing 
T.A.’s troubles in school and the school district’s evaluation that suggested T.A. might have 
ADHD). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. (discussing the evaluation process, which lasted from Dec. 2000, when the 
guidance counselor wrote T.A. a referral for evaluation, until the meeting in June 2001, when 
the school district staff and T.A.’s mother agreed that T.A. did not have a learning disability). 
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they had evaluated him for ADHD.7 The team of specialists 
determined, and T.A.’s parents agreed, that T.A. did not have a 
learning disability and therefore was not eligible for special education 
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA).8 
Shortly after the meeting, T.A. began using marijuana.9 His drug 
use had become regular by the following year, and he began to exhibit 
behavioral disturbances.10 T.A.’s parents took him to a psychologist, 
who diagnosed T.A. with ADHD, depression, math disorder, and 
marijuana abuse.11 The psychologist recommended that T.A.’s parents 
place him in a three week residential program, and they complied.12 
Following his discharge, T.A.’s parents placed him in a residential 
private school designed for children with academic and behavioral 
difficulties.13 
His parents then requested a due process hearing under 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f) of the IDEA to challenge the school’s determination that 
T.A. was ineligible for special education benefits and to obtain 
reimbursement for the private school tuition.14 In response to the 
initiation of the hearing, the school district reevaluated T.A. for 
learning disabilities and again determined that T.A. was not eligible 
for special education under the IDEA.15 But the hearing officer 
overseeing T.A.’s due process hearing determined that the school 
district was to reimburse T.A.’s parents for private school tuition 
because, contrary to the school’s finding, T.A. was eligible for special 
education under the IDEA and the school district had failed to offer 
T.A. a free appropriate public education (FAPE).16 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. If T.A. had been eligible under the IDEA, the school would have been obligated to 
take additional steps to ensure that he received an education that appropriately met his 
individual needs. See infra text accompanying notes 31–44 (discussing the IDEA and eligibility 
requirements). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1082. 
 11. Id. at 1081–82. 
 12. Id. at 1082. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1082–83 (explaining that the hearing officer determined that the school district 
was responsible for the costs of the private school, but not for the costs of the rehabilitation 
center, because the school district failed to provide T.A. with the minimum level of education, a 
FAPE, mandated by the IDEA). 
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The school district appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, which 
determined that § 1412(a)(10)(C) of the IDEA barred T.A.’s parents 
from receiving tuition reimbursement.17 Upon T.A.’s appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C) does not act as a 
statutory bar against private school tuition reimbursement to parents 
whose IDEA-eligible child never received special education services 
at public school.18 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari upon 
the school district’s appeal.19 The question before the Court is whether 
the 1997 amendments of the IDEA, specifically  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C), bar parents of a child with disabilities from 
receiving private school tuition reimbursement when the child did not 
previously receive special education services at the public school.20 
The Court will view this case in light of the previous decisions on 
point. An equally divided Court21 affirmed without opinion a Second 
Circuit case, Board of Education v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F.22 In that 
case, the Second Circuit had issued a summary order reversing the 
district court’s decision and remanding for the district court to decide 
the case23 in compliance with the Second Circuit’s holding in Frank G. 
v. Board of Education. 24 Frank G. held that the 1997 amendments did 
not bar parents from receiving reimbursement when their child had 
not previously received special education services at school.25 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Frank G.26 
The Court in the pending case will revisit the interpretation of the 
1997 amendments to the IDEA to more clearly resolve the circuit 
 
 17. Id. at 1083. 
 18. Id. at 1086. 
 19. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009). 
 20. Brief of Petitioner at (i), Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. 08-305 (Feb. 25, 2009). 
 21. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the opinion, so the Court was split four to four in 
its decision. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 129 S. Ct. at 987. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 
128 S. Ct. 1 (2007). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 193 Fed. App’x. 26 (2d Cir. 2006) (not 
reported). 
 24. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007). 
 25. Id. at 376 (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not bar private tuition reimbursement 
when the school district knew, before the child’s removal from public school, that the child 
needed special education services). 
 26. Id. 
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split between the Second,27 Eleventh,28 and Ninth Circuits,29 finding 
that parents could receive tuition reimbursement when their child had 
never received special education at public school, and the First 
Circuit,30 holding that they could not. The Court should decide that 
parents whose children did not previously receive special education in 
public school may receive tuition reimbursement under the IDEA at 
the court’s discretion as a matter of equity. 
I.  THE IDEA 
The purpose of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education 
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to 
meet their unique needs.”31 A free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) must include “special education and related services”32 and 
must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.”33 The Court has emphasized that a FAPE is a 
low standard, explaining that “the Act was more to open the door of 
public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than 
to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”34 
 
 27. Frank  G., 459 F.3d 356; Tom F., 193 Fed. App’x 26. 
 28. M .M . ex rel. C.M . v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a child who never 
attended public school but did receive early childhood special educational services from a public 
agency is not statutorily barred from  receiving private school tuition reimbursement when the school 
district failed to provide a FAPE). 
 29. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 30. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2004), 
 31. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2005). 
 32. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9), (14), (26), and (29); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
181–82 (1982) (defining a FAPE in the context of the IDEA’s precursor, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA)). 
 33. The Supreme Court interpreted the FAPE provision in the EAHCA in Rowley, 458 
U.S. at 181–82. The Court set forth a two part test. First, courts should ask whether the state 
complied with the Act’s procedures, then the court should ask whether the IEP was “reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Id. at 206–07. 
 34. Id. at 192. For example, the Tenth Circuit determined in Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. 
Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1145–46 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S. Ct.1356 (2009), that parents 
could not receive tuition reimbursement because their son was making progress in public school 
in accordance with his IEP even though he was exhibiting severe behavioral problems (such as 
tantrums, violent behavior at home and in public, difficulties sleeping, regression in toilet 
training, and spreading bowel movements over his bedroom). The court cited Rowley, 548 U.S. 
at 201 n.23, in determining that the IDEA does not oblige schools to ensure the “self 
sufficiency” of all disabled children, rather the IDEA provides school districts with broad 
discretion in developing an IEP. Id. at 1151. 
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A school must develop an individual education plan (IEP) for a 
child with disabilities in order to meet the FAPE requirement. An 
IEP is “a comprehensive statement of the [child’s] educational needs . 
. . and the specially designed instruction and related services” that the 
school agrees to implement.35 Determining the content and goals of 
the IEP is a collaborative effort by the child’s parents, school 
administrators, and other specialists,36 though the Court gives broad 
deference to the school administration’s choices in developing an 
IEP.37 A school district that is unable to provide a FAPE for a child 
with disabilities can refer the student to a private school at no cost to 
his parents, but the school district must pay the tuition and other 
expenses.38 
A parent dissatisfied with the school’s treatment of his child is 
entitled to a due process hearing presided over by a state-appointed 
hearing officer.39 Either the parent or the school district may appeal 
the hearing officer’s decision in federal court40 and the courts have 
broad discretion to craft relief to remedy IDEA violations.41 For 
example, the Supreme Court in School Committee of Town of 
Burlington v. Department of Education42 decided that, under the 
provision authorizing the court to “grant such relief as the court 
determines is appropriate,”43 a court may order the school to 
reimburse parents for private school tuition after determining both 
that the IEP was inappropriate and that the private placement was 
appropriate to meet the child’s needs.44 
The legal controversy between the circuit courts arises from the 
1997 amendments to the IDEA, specifically 20 U.S.C.  
 
 35. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985). 
 36. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
 37. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. 
 38. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i). 
 39. Id. at § 1415(b)(6). 
 40. Id. at § 1415(f). 
 41. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). 
 42. Id. (interpreting the Education of the Handicapped Act). 
 43. Now ,embodied in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2005). This provision has not been 
changed since the time of the Burlington decision. Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d at 369. 
 44. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (“In a case where a court determines that a private 
placement desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for 
placement in a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that ‘appropriate’ 
relief would include a prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and 
implement at public expense an IEP placing the child in a private school.”) The Court 
reaffirmed this standard in Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1993). 
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§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), entitled “Reimbursement for Private School 
Placement.” The statute reads: 
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received 
special education and related services under the authority of a 
public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or 
secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public 
agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to 
reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court 
or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free 
appropriate public education available to the child in a timely 
manner prior to that enrollment.45 
The Second Circuit determined that the statute did not foreclose 
this remedy for children who never received special education 
services, rather it merely provided additional rules for parents whose 
children did previously receive special education at public school.46 
The First Circuit, by contrast, interpreted this provision as overruling 
the Court’s prior holdings that a court may award tuition 
reimbursement to a parent whose child had not previously received 
special education services.47 
II.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF REIMBURSEMENT 
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the 1997 
amendments to the IDEA do not bar parents from recovering the 
cost of private school for a child who did not receive special education 
and related services at public school.48 The Second Circuit heard two 
cases concerning the interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). In Board 
of Education v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., the Southern District of New 
York relied on Greenland School District v. Amy N. in deciding that 
“where a child has not previously received special education from a 
 
 45. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 46. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 373–74 (explaining that Congress intended to limit the availability 
of private tuition reimbursement when a child had previously received special education 
services from a public agency). 
 47. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 159–60 (2004). One such case was 
Carter, 510 U.S. at 9–10 (holding that a court may award private school tuition reimbursement 
to parents who withdraw their child from a public school that is not providing a FAPE and place 
him in a private school that does not meet all of IDEA’s requirements). 
 48. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, 523 F.3d at 1080; Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert 
F., 193 Fed. App’x. 26, 26 (2d Cir. 2006) (not reported), aff’d 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007); Frank G. v. Bd. 
of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 359 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007). 
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public agency, there is no authority to reimburse the tuition expenses 
arising from a parent’s unilateral placement of the child in private 
school.”49 The Second Circuit issued a summary order reversing and 
remanding the judgment of the district court to render a decision in 
accordance with Frank G. v. Board of Education, an earlier decision 
on the same issue with a detailed opinion.50 The Supreme Court 
affirmed Tom F. without an opinion.51 
The Second Circuit in Frank G. held that the 1997 Amendments 
to the IDEA did not bar private tuition reimbursement when the 
child had never received special education in public school.52 First, the 
court considered whether the statute contained a plain and 
unambiguous statement about tuition reimbursement under these 
conditions.53 The court determined that 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) 
does not explicitly limit tuition reimbursement to children who 
previously received special education from a public agency and it 
does not state that tuition reimbursement is unavailable when the 
child never received special education through a public agency.54 The 
court also pointed out that the portion of the Act upon which School 
Committee of Town of Burlington v. Department of Education relied in 
authorizing reimbursement, then § 1415(e)(2) and now  
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), was not changed in the 1997 amendments.55 
The court then assessed the ambiguous statute in terms of the 
purposes of the IDEA.56 One of the ways the statute seeks to secure 
educational opportunities for children with disabilities is by allowing 
courts to grant appropriate relief to parents when the IEP is 
inappropriate and parents place their child in private school.57 
 
 49. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 2005 WL 22866, at *3. 
 50. Tom F., 193 Fed. App’x. at 26. 
 51. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007). 
 52. Frank G., 459 F.3d at359. 
 53. Id. at 368. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 369. 
 56. Id. at 370–71. 
 57. Id. at 371 (“One of the primary ways in which the IDEA seeks to ensure that children 
with disabilities receive a free appropriate education is by conferring broad discretion on the 
district court to grant relief it deems appropriate to parents of disabled children who opt for a 
unilateral private placement in cases where the parents’ placement is determined to be proper 
and the proposed IEP is determined to be inadequate.”). 
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Construing the statute to limit the availability of that remedy would 
undermine the statute’s objective.58 
Finally, the court said that ambiguous rules should be interpreted 
so as to avoid absurd results.59 Requiring children to receive special 
education at public school before parents could place them in private 
school would mean that some children would have to suffer an 
education that fails to meet the statutory FAPE requirements for a 
significant period of time before parents could have the right to place 
their children in a setting that could provide a FAPE.60 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.61 The court emphasized that the 
purpose of the IDEA is to provide a FAPE for children with 
disabilities, and barring reimbursement for children who have not 
received special education services conflicts with that purpose.62 
Section 1412(a)(10)(C) does not apply to children who have not 
previously received special education, so their parents may only 
receive reimbursement as a matter of equity under § 1415(i)(2)(C).63 
The court reiterated that it would be an absurd result to require a 
child to “wait (an indefinite, perhaps lengthy period) until [he] has 
received special education in public school before sending [him] to an 
appropriate private school, no matter how uncooperative the school 
district and no matter how inappropriate the special education.”64 
Judge Rymer in his dissent agreed with the Second Circuit that  
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) “carries forward the pre-1997 law on equitable relief,” 
but argued that Burlington and § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not apply in this 
case if T.A. was removed from public school because of his drug 
problem and not an IDEA-eligible disability like ADHD.65 The IDEA 
requires schools to provide a FAPE for a child only if he has a 
disability recognized by the statute.66 The dissent stated, “[a] local 
 
 58. Id. at 372. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; see also M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“[F]orcing parents into accepting inadequate IEPs in order to preserve their right to 
reimbursement runs contrary to the rights recognized in the Burlington line of cases.”). 
 61. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 62. Id. at 1087. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1090 (Rymer, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. 
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educational agency that has made a FAPE available has no obligation 
to pay the cost of education . . . of a child with a disability at a private 
school when the parents elect the private placement.”67 If T.A.’s 
parents withdrew him from public school for any reason other than 
that the school was not accommodating his learning disabilities, then 
the school would not be responsible for tuition reimbursement.68 
III.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST REIMBURSEMENT 
The arguments counseling against reimbursing parents for private 
school expenses can be divided into four main categories: 1) a plain 
meaning argument; 2) a spending clause argument; 3) a statutory 
purpose argument; and 4) a public policy argument focusing on the 
financial burdens associated with increased taxpayer liability for 
private school tuition. 
A. Plain Meaning 
Critics of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion argue that the court’s 
interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C) violated the plain meaning of the 
statute. In Greenland School District v. Amy N., the First Circuit held 
that the plain meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C) reflected Congress’s intent 
to bar tuition reimbursement for children who had never received 
special education in public school.69 In supporting this conclusion, the 
court relied on a report from the Committee on Education and the 
Workforce recommending that Congress revise the statute to require 
children to receive special education services in public school before 
parents can be reimbursed for private school tuition.70 
The school district similarly argues that the plain language of the 
statute creates an inference that the statute bars reimbursement by 
relying on other parts of the statute.71 For example, the headings of 
the statute’s titles suggest that Congress was setting forth school 
obligations to provide tuition reimbursement.72 Additionally,  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) places restrictions on receipt of private school 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1091. 
 69. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 70. Id. at 159 (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 105-95 at 90 (1997)). 
 71. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 20, at 19–21. 
 72. Id. at 24 (discussing the heading of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii): “Reimbursement for 
Private School Placement”). 
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tuition reimbursement for children who previously received special 
education at public school.73 Finally, the equitable remedy in  
§ 1415(i)(2)(C) is only available at the discretion of the court, whereas 
either a hearing officer or the courts may grant the remedies under  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).74 The fact that Congress provided a remedial 
scheme for obtaining private tuition reimbursement when the child 
received special education services at public school may suggest that 
the remedy was only to be available for children falling within  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii): children who previously received special 
education and related services from a public agency, did not receive a 
FAPE from the public school, and were enrolled in private school 
without their school districts’ consent.75 
B. Spending Clause 
The school district argues that the Spending Clause bars parents 
from receiving tuition reimbursement for a child who never received 
special education services at the public school.76 Congress passed the 
IDEA under its Spending Clause authority, and therefore must 
provide states with “clear notice” of the need to reimburse parents for 
private school tuition when the parents’ child never received special 
education services at a public school.77 The school district argued that, 
after the 1997 revisions, schools did not have notice that they could be 
liable to parents for these expenses because the statute addresses 
tuition reimbursement only for children who previously received 
special education services from the state, and it is not readily apparent 
that schools could be liable to children who never received special 
education.78 Schools should not be liable to this class of plaintiffs, the 
petitioner contends, until Congress or the courts provide notice that 
the school may be required to provide private tuition reimbursement 
under these circumstances.79 
 
 73. Id. at 23. 
 74. Id. at 24–25. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 16–17. 
 77. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7–9, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. 08-305 (Feb. 25, 
2009) (citing Arlington Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (finding 
that the IDEA, as a spending clause statute, is subject to the clear notice rule)). 
 78. Brief of Petitioner at 18–19, supra note 20. 
 79. Id. 
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The respondent countered that this argument was meritless 
because the remedy sought “merely enforces the Spending Clause 
contract.”80 Allowing parents to receive tuition reimbursement is a 
remedy for a violation of a substantive right—the child’s right to a 
FAPE—so schools are on notice that they may be liable to parents 
and children if they violate their obligations under the IDEA.81 
Ultimately, the petitioner’s spending clause argument is likely to be 
unavailing because courts have previously recognized the availability 
of tuition reimbursement for similarly situated students,82 and the 
language of the statute does not explicitly exclude these parents from 
receiving reimbursement. 
C. Statutory Purpose 
The original purpose of the IDEA was to provide a FAPE to 
children with disabilities, because they received insufficient education 
prior to the Act’s adoption.83 Reimbursing a parent for private school 
is a last resort that is only available when public school fails to 
provide the disabled child with an appropriate education.84 In an 
effort to provide education in a public school setting, the IDEA 
provides a collaborative framework to encourage good faith 
cooperation between parents and the school.85 This cooperative 
framework requires that the school system have the opportunity to 
 
 80. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 29, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, No. 08-305 
(Feb. 25, 2009). 
 81. See id. at 28–29 (citing Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 
516 (2007) (rejecting the argument that the IDEA did not provide clear notice of parents’ rights 
because recognizing parents’ rights did not impose any obligations on the school that they were 
not already required to observe)). 
 82. See discussion of Burlington, supra text accompanying notes 42–44, and of the First 
Circuit’s holding in Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2004), 
supra text accompanying note 47. 
 83. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Boards Ass’n, Am. Ass’n of Sch. Admin. and Nat’l Ass’n of State 
Directors of Special Educ. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. 
v. T.A, No. 08-305 (Oct. 6, 2008) (citing Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51–52 
(2005), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2), and Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982)). 
 84. Id. at 10; Brief of Council of the Great City Sch. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 5–7, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, No. 08-305 (Mar. 4, 2009) (explaining that 
Congress has two goals in ensuring a public education for children with disabilities: that they 
would receive an education in a more constructive learning environment and that their 
education would be as cost effective as possible (citing S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 9)). 
 85. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 12–13; Brief of City of New York as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12–13, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A, No. 08-305 (Feb. 
25, 2009) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005)). 
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determine whether it can provide a FAPE to a child before his 
parents withdraw him from public school.86 Critics of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove School District v. T.A. argue that it 
“will encourage parents not to collaborate with public school districts 
because to do so will disadvantage them if they later seek private-
school tuition reimbursement.”87 But § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) eliminates 
that concern. It states that courts may deny or reduce reimbursement 
if parents do not notify the school that they intend to place the child 
in a private school.88 This supports the argument that parents must 
give the school the opportunity to provide a FAPE before they can 
receive reimbursement for private school.89 The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding does not disturb this requirement. 
D. Costs of Education 
Several of the amici briefs raise concerns about the burdens that 
tuition reimbursement for children not previously enrolled in special 
education will place on the educational and judicial systems. Schools 
will be unable to anticipate their liability because any student could 
potentially receive private tuition reimbursement, and the cost of 
placing a child in private school averages about $26,000—more than 
four times the cost per child in public school.90 Two amicus briefs 
suggested that this uncertainty will make it difficult for schools to 
create a workable budget91 and will divert special education funds 
from students who remain at public school.92 Furthermore, due 
process hearings alone are costly,93 and schools may try to settle or to 
make “bad faith offers to avoid litigation.”94 
 
 86. Brief of City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 85; 
Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160 (stating that requiring a student to receive special education services 
at the school first “serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, 
before the child is removed, to . . . determine whether a free appropriate public education can 
be provided in the public schools”). 
 87. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 11. 
 88. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2005). 
 89. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 16. 
 90. Id. at 23; Brief of Council of the Great City Sch., supra note 84, at 23. 
 91. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 20–21. 
 92. Brief of Council of the Great City Schools, supra note 84, at 28–29. 
 93. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 23 (explaining that the hearings cost 
around $10,000 on average). 
 94. Michael T. McCarthy, Don’t Get the Wrong IDEA: How the Fourth Circuit Misread the 
Words and Spirit of Special Education Law—And How to Fix It, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1707, 
1742–43 (2008) (“If some parents abuse the IEP process to place their children in appealing 
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The amici briefs also caution that the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation creates an unfair litigation advantage for parents that 
will encourage a flood of litigation.95 If a school district never 
provided special education services, then it would be hard to prove 
that they provided a FAPE.96 This problem of proof, argue the amici 
briefs, creates incentives for parents who want to place their children 
in private schools and play the “tuition-reimbursement lottery” to try 
to have the public school pay the private school tuition.97 
Whether this is actually a problem is questionable. Because of the 
high cost of tuition, parents are unlikely to place a child in a private 
school if they have little reasonable belief that they will receive 
reimbursement.98 Even when parents have a reasonable belief that 
they will prevail, many may be unable to afford private school tuition 
while they navigate the due process hearing. Others that could 
temporarily pay the cost of tuition may be unwilling to risk that the 
hearing could be decided against them. 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RENDER A DECISION  
ALLOWING TUITION REIMBURSEMENT AS A MATTER OF EQUITY 
The amendments to the IDEA narrowed the scope of tuition 
reimbursement for students who are currently receiving special 
education in schools.99 Given this indication of congressional intent, it 
is reasonable to similarly restrict, but not completely eliminate, tuition 
reimbursement for students who have not previously received special 
education. The Supreme Court should articulate a clearer standard 
drawing on the Second Circuit decision in Frank G. v. Board of 
Education and the Court’s prior holding in School Committee of Town 
of Burlington v. Department of Education. 
 
private schools . . . , other children will suffer when public school systems make bad faith offers 
to avoid litigation based on procedural defects.”). 
 95. Brief of Nat’l Sch. Bd. Ass’n, supra note 83, at 25. 
 96. Id. at 17. 
 97. Id. at 25; Brief of Council of the Great City Sch., supra note 84, at 27–28. 
 98. Logan Steiner, Playing Lawyers: The Implications of Endowing Parents with 
Substantive Rights under IDEA in Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 127 S. Ct. 1994 
(2007), 31 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1169, 1174 (2008) (quoting Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Winkelman). 
 99. See discussion of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), supra text accompanying notes 45–46 
(explaining statutory limitations on private tuition reimbursement for parents whose child 
received special education through a public agency). 
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The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA do not explicitly prohibit 
tuition reimbursement when a child with disabilities has not 
previously received special education funds from public school. 
Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) states only that parents of a child who 
previously received special education may receive tuition 
reimbursement, but it does not contain any language suggesting that 
children who had not received special education should be ineligible 
for reimbursement. The statute provides different remedial schemes 
for children who did previously receive special education than for 
those who did not. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) allows either a court or 
a hearing officer to award reimbursement to parents whose child did 
previously receive special education services, subject to the limitations 
in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). As discussed above, many courts over the past 
several decades have awarded tuition reimbursement as a matter of 
equity under § 1415(i)(2)(C) to children who never received special 
education at public school.100 As the report of Committee on 
Education and the Workforce confirms, Congress was fully aware of 
the availability of this remedy.101 If Congress had intended to 
eliminate the availability of this remedy, it was well within its 
authority to state as much in the statute. The fact that the 
Committee’s recommendation was not reflected in the version of the 
statute that was adopted is indicative of Congressional intent on this 
matter. 
Although Congress did not eliminate the availability of tuition 
reimbursement for children who never received public school special 
education, the 1997 amendments did place additional restrictions on 
the availability of reimbursement. The most important limitation was 
provided in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), which states: 
this subchapter does not require a local educational agency to pay 
for the cost of education, including special education and related 
services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if 
that agency made a free appropriate public education available to 
the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private 
school or facility.102 
 
 100. See supra note 47 (discussing prior holdings that found an equitable remedy under the 
IDEA for tuition reimbursement) and text accompanying note 55 (discussing relief under 
§1415(i)(2)(C)). 
 101. See supra text accompanying note 70 (discussing the Committee Report). 
 102. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i). 
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This provision does not contain the limiting language of  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), which applies only when the child previously 
received special education. This absence of limiting language suggests 
that the statute applies to all instances in which parents wish to 
receive tuition reimbursement. Thus, when the public school “ma[kes] 
a FAPE available,” a parent is not eligible to receive private school 
tuition reimbursement regardless of whether his child previously 
received special education. 
The provision does not provide any guidance as to the relevant 
time period in assessing whether the school made a FAPE available. 
The statute’s “made available” language does not distinguish between 
a FAPE provided before the parent removed the child from public 
school and a FAPE that is to be provided in the future. Because a 
FAPE may be “made available” to a student even after he is 
withdrawn from school, courts should interpret “made available” 
broadly to include both prior and prospective educational 
opportunities. 
The Court should recognize, in light of the 1997 Amendments and 
the competing policy concerns discussed above, a rebuttable 
presumption against private school tuition reimbursement when the 
child has not previously received special education and related 
services at a public school. Parents may receive reimbursement if the 
child has a disability rendering him eligible for benefits under the 
IDEA,103 the school violated the procedural provisions of the IDEA,104 
the school did not provide the child with an education reasonably 
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits prior to 
withdrawal,105 the child’s parents notified the school of their intent to 
place the child in private school or otherwise gave the school the 
opportunity to evaluate the child and develop an IEP,106 and the 
 
 103. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2008); M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
 104. Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dept. of Ed. v. Dept. of Ed., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 105. Id. 
 106. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2005) (providing that reimbursement for a child who 
previously received special education may be limited or denied if the parent did not provide 
notice of intent to withdraw, except in certain circumstances, e.g., the school prevented the 
parent from providing notice); Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7J, 766 F. Supp. 852 (D. Or. 
1991); see Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 152, 158–59 (2004) (explaining that, 
prior to the 1997 amendments, several courts required parents to give notice before removing 
their children from public school). 
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school does not have a plan to provide a FAPE or the current IEP is 
inadequate to meet his needs should he return to school.107 
Recognizing this rebuttable presumption provides the best 
balance between the interests of the school and the child. The Court 
has traditionally afforded broad deference to schools about their 
decisions regarding the best interests of their students.108 The 
assumption underlying this deference is that a school is in a better 
position than a court to assess students’s needs and that schools 
generally perform their duties adequately.109 To allow parents to 
obtain reimbursement for the cost of private school too easily would 
suggest that schools are incompetent at providing an appropriate 
education for a broad class of children with disabilities. Because 
courts operate on the belief that schools are generally competent 
educational providers, private school should be a last resort available 
only in circumstances where the school is unable (or perhaps 
unwilling) to provide a FAPE.110 
Providing school administrators with deference to identify a 
disabled student’s educational needs requires that courts not 
unreasonably interfere with school administration, and part of school 
administration is budgeting. The cost of private school tuition is 
substantial, so opening the door too wide for parents to receive 
tuition reimbursement would interfere with a school’s ability to 
budget its expenses and to provide a quality education for all of its 
students. Accordingly, courts should not endorse a policy that would 
significantly impair a school’s ability to provide for the education of 
its students. 
 
 107. See supra discussion of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), text accompanying notes 100–101 
(explaining that parents may not receive tuition reimbursement if the public school provided a 
FAPE and suggesting that the school may meet the FAPE requirement via a prospective IEP). 
 108. See supra text accompanying note 42 (explaining the Court’s statement in Burlington 
that the statutory provision grants courts broad deference in determining the appropriate 
remedy). 
 109. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208–09 (1982) (“The primary 
responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for 
choosing the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs, was left by the Act to state 
and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.”); id. at 
211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing the district court for failing to grant adequate 
deference to the state’s Commissioner of Education and the hearing officer). 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44 (explaining that the statute authorizes courts 
to award relief when the schools provide an inappropriate education), 99–101 (discussing 
restrictions on tuition reimbursement when the school did provide or will provide a FAPE). 
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But courts must also provide a remedy for children with 
disabilities when their school fails to provide to them an adequate 
education. It is unknown how many children, like T.A., struggle with 
their studies for years before teachers or staff even suspect that they 
might have a learning disability.111 Even if the school does suspect a 
learning disability, they may not inform the parents of their 
assessment.112 Evaluating whether a student has a disability that 
qualifies him for IDEA benefits is a lengthy process113 and may not 
produce change if a child’s education is not sufficiently impaired.114 If 
a parent disagrees with the school’s decision, they must tolerate a due 
process hearing—another lengthy process. Any reasonable parent, 
believing his child is impaired by a learning disability, would attempt 
to obtain the educational resources necessary for his child quickly, not 
wait years for an uncertain result. 
T.A.’s parents, however, probably would not qualify for tuition 
reimbursement under this standard. As the Ninth Circuit’s dissent 
noted, T.A.’s parents removed T.A. from public school primarily 
because of his drug problem, not because of his ADHD.115 This creates 
questions of fact for the trial court as to whether the school actually 
failed to provide a FAPE before T.A. was removed from public school 
and as to whether the school failed to provide an adequate IEP for 
him to return to public school. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should hold, consistently with its prior 
opinions, that courts may grant, as a matter of their equitable 
discretion, private school tuition reimbursement for a child who did 
not previously receive special education or related services under  
 
 111. Recall that T.A.’s guidance counselor, not his teachers, prompted the inquiry. Supra 
text accompanying note 4. 
 112. Recall that the Forest Grove School District did not tell T.A.’s parents that he had 
been evaluated for ADHD until much later. Supra text accompanying note 8. 
 113. T.A.’s evaluation took about nine months. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 
1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 114. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing the school’s determination that T.A. 
was ineligible under the IDEA because his ADHD “did not have a severe effect on [his] 
educational performance”). 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 9–13 (explaining that T.A.’s parents removed him 
from public school because of his behavioral difficulties and drug problem and placed him in a 
rehabilitation center). 
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§ 1415(i)(2)(C) of the IDEA. To guide lower courts that must decide 
whether to grant tuition reimbursement, the Court should articulate a 
presumption against reimbursement that the parents may overcome 
by showing that their child was eligible for and denied IDEA benefits, 
that the parents gave the school the opportunity to remedy the 
situation, and that the school refused or was unable. Because there is 
doubt as to whether T.A. was denied a FAPE and as to whether the 
school could have provided him with a FAPE, the Court should 
reverse the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and remand for factual 
determinations. 
 
